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During a series of briefings on science and publ }c policyheld for academicians by federal officials in July, 1969 one govern-
ment representative observed that  if those attending had detected
evidence of paranoia in some of the statements made earlier by National
Science Foundation officials tbry should not be shocked. It was not
that the NSF people were imagining somebody was out :to get them. Some-
body really was!
The point being made was that NSF is viewed by some as a prime
target for budget -cutting as the federal ,government looks more and
more for economies. Not just NSF is threatened. Much of the budget
that goes for research and development -- science and science-based
technology -- is under a squeeze. The ,'i.et Nam war and the social
problems in the cities push for support and science and technology is
caught in the middle. Agencies formerly able to spend v irtually un-
limited funds for R & D
	 Defense Department and National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, for example--are cutting back in this
area.
But the problem of science end technology is only in part fi-
nancial. In a speech May 10, 1968, Donald Hornig, President Johnson's
Science Advisor, asked, ' "Is there a crisis in science?" He answered
by saying that, in an immediate sense, there was a crisis in finan-
cial support. In a long-tern sense, howover, he pointed out that
there was a crisis rooted in the fact that members of Congress and of
the public see "a scientific community which, insisting on its purity,
will not deign to communicate with the public and justify itself, but
prefers to believe that its virtues are so self-evident that a right-
minded society must necessarily support it on its own terms." He
suggested that the scientific community through its pride and aloof-
ness2had "done much to alienate itself from tite society which supports
it
1. Washington Serxinars for Affi:liate8, Science and Public
Policy Studies Group, July 6-18, 1969.
Sk	 2. D. F. Hornig, Science, Vol. 1616 p 24$ (1968) Citedby Janes Carroll, "ScienceanRX77ie City: Tie Question of Authority,
Sciences February 29, 1969, p. 902•
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of a :L	 "^ argiiin g thvtj	 Vlore.
.:unding anc i:i ,_mediate fu'kb-are of science and uach-
ology than —211.et Nam	 F,,oacies, The o ld basis upon ve.'h chgo ,, ;ernraent-sc::^ cnc;e 1 ,el.a .:io nship had been forged folio -ing World
War II is in try nsition. T,tAe sci.ent-i' fic establishment -Zoha'k; Don lr .Price described in 1965 as "a set of institut ions suppo 1., ed by taxfunds, but	 Q3on. 4aith, and without direct responsibility •^ o
political. con^ti ,all ° is no longer so privileged. It Faces a new poj_: ,
tical en;ra ^vnnw x party ox which is hostile, and which accuses
science and technology of bringing harm to man in the name of
progress. ^
In adaptin6 to aen conditions as the price of continuing and
strengthening the relationship, the scientific community will have
to change. So also will the government. Scientific attitudes and
bureaucratic processes that sufficed during a period of rapid grow-tb
and widespread public support will no longer do. The administrative
pluralism that served to carry out federal science policy in the
past will be retained but a much stronger effort'by President and
Congress will have to be made to manage the overall. enterprise.
The scientific community will have to move to apply sitself more
consciously to improving the human condition.
THE RESEARCH PARTNERSHIP IN TRANSITION
What has come to be mown as the government-science marriage
grew out of the eNperience of war. During the Second World, War
science and technology was mobi "LLzed -"on the spot" for public
service. Scientists and engineers in universit i es and industrial
laboratories throughtout the country stopped what they were doing
and diverted their attention to helping the military defeat the
enemy. Today the military agencies remain the pr cipal single
supporter of the nation's research establishment. As during World
War II, the government supplies most of the money while private
institutions provide the bulk of the manpower.
The federal government supports two-thirds of all expend-
itures in the United States for research and development. Only
20 percent of the 3overnment contribution is spent in its own lab.
oratories; two-thirds of the funds go to industry; universities
and non-profit organizations receive the remainder. Industry per-
forms most of the nation's applied research and development (tech
nology) . Universi.ti e's do the largest proportion of the basic
3. Don K. Price, The Scientific EstateCambridge, Mass*..
Press of Har var n^.t ersit^ress "^I ^ 	 1^.Belknap	 5), P
4. Dwight Waldo, discussing "Public Administration in a
Time of Revolutions," in the Public Administration Review of July/
August 1968, P. 363, noted the "growing react ion agaInst science
continued on the .bottom of page 3.)
7	 _	 -
3vGseare;l^	 °^ _ ^t	 `ppro:fimately thr"uarters of the total
federal p^  > . 7'	 is spent by three agencies _-- Defeir ^ ,
and, the At— owl ^'^^ ^ ; ^ Corimission. The basic divisions	 tuba, +Ac
-)rivate roleo 1,-n 4:^h : partner, ship have been stable over the
as has been
	
of agencies with a national s. curi ty
flavor.	 Fear in hot war was the shotgun that brought, al- ,out. -;'ie
marriage. Faith 1uring Cold War that science could sa^°egg^^;^^^:
America was the sustaining force. and national pride--bruised by
Sputnik--- was the consummation. Whatever their merit, such stimF
uli provide an uncertain basis for a successful marriage involv-
ing enormous impacts upon higher education and the economy.
Budpetcary trends indicates' the speed with which government
and science drew together, as well as their present estrangement,
In 1940 the United States government spent about $ ",75 million on
researc^ and development. By 1953 this figure rose: to $2 billion.
By 1966 1 federal expenditures 6tood at $16 billion. Where seemed
no end in sigh; to the increases; various adminiistgative agencies
projected spending would reach $22 billion by 1970.E
4, (Continued from bottom of page 2.) and technology" and
declared: "I refer to a mounting feeling that science and tech-
nology create a cold, artificial, impersonal, dehumanized, and even
monstrous world. On one level it is a revolution against the mach."
ine and everything machine-like and machine-made. But it is much
mare, and at another level is a revolution against a 'system' that
sustains and promotes a machine technology. The revolution against
science and technology is seen positively as a revolution on be-
half of the individual and individualism, against the invasion of
privacy and for individual rights. The IBM card is often a symbol
of the enemy, and beards and bare feet are seen as the symbols of
emancipation and rebellion."
5. In this and succeeding cases budget figures are for fiscal
rather than calendar years and derive from the Bureau of the
Budget's Special .Analysis Q for Federal Research, Development,
and Related Programs (January, 1969).
6. William Carey, "Science Policy Making in the United
States," Ciba Foundation and Science of Science Foundation
SM20sium 6n ecislon WIFE in National Science o c
	 deReudk
e , (London: J. & A. Churchilr ltd., 1
	 , p.
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unal-in shed1 y of a 15 percent a h . ^	 ^e;:. a.n
:Ln b^ ''-*lc	 :-,uppor. t by the federal governmen^. .
Hut event,.; did not proceed as proponents of sc- exic:., spnn-Ai ^1. i
expected or ?roped.
	 In 1967 federal expenditures	 l,heF^< o"
the prev ious
 y?Caar oily slightly­ ^oing from $16 billion '^o ^ °:a : , 8
billion. `110 ,3 f. ure remained at 16. g billion in 1968.	 O; ;^
pected to	 t,) $16.4 billion in 1969 and still be
1967 fi crure,—Iri .1970, at which time federal obligations of .^31 ^.'l
billion are Forecast.
The .^`= c:L.
 for basic research, -which is what the scient:.j'ic
community
 clnre; most about--have levelled off. In 196$, funds
for r aseaxch in colleges and univer:;.i.ties•--almost entirely baste;
research -rd relatrd expend t,ures•--,stood at $1.4 billion; in 196(1,
the estimate is 4')l , I E, billion ajain; with spending slated to go up,
to $1.5 bil. ion in 1G70. The 15 percent annual increment: thought_
necessary U:  ac;i.enc^: is to keep up with increasing costs in equip—
ment, stu;ients, and inflation is far from being attained.
Many aniversities, which have come to count on federal. re^-
search money for basic operating expenses, have been hard hit.
A recent report prepared by the New York Academy of Science en-
titled Thb Crisis Yacin American Science declared that any gaiaiv.:
in the M arm of 'better discipl fie and closer planning of current
and future spending were overwhelmingly offset by the loss of
opportunity and continuity in scientific research. It called for
immediate corrective action and the "establishment, of a long-rang;
federal science policy that obviates future crises . "9
Bas ic Rese`-, rch and National Goals, Report to the House
Cowaittee on Science and :Astronautics, by the Natior.ul. Academy o '
Scie',nces (Wash., D. C.: USGP, 1965), P. 13. A number of legis-
lators thought it Ovals arroganu for any group to assume it should
automatically be given a 15% boost in .funding every year. Hornig
disavowed the figure,	 "We accept as the goal that .America
must be second to none in most of the significant fields of sci-
ence.	 What is not accepted is the notion that every part of
science should groil at Come automatic and predetermined rate, 1570
per year or any other. number, as a consequence." Address to the
American Phys-J.cal Society, ttiu sh . , D. C. April 26, 1967, Cited by
D.S. Greenber g ) The Pol i tics of Pure _Sc ience (N.Y.; New American
Library, 1967, p ...TU1. ,. 	 _..
$, ,Massachusetts Institute of Technology receives some 84% ofits total budget from the feders 1 government; Princeton, 47%; Colum-=
bia, 42%; Frown, 35%; Chicago, 28%. Impact of Federal Research
and Development Pr is ;rams , Study No 6, House Select Committee on
Goverr,.ment Research, Deport. (wash. , D.0 . USGPO, 1964) , PP • 33°-34.
Cited by Greenberg ^... cit!• pp ., 36-37.
9. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee
on Science, Research, and Development, Hearings, 91st Congress,
1st Sess ,,
 Vol .
 1, 1970 National Science +oun ation AuthorizationGash, , I1. C
	
USGPU	 , 9 I . pp.	 ereina ter cite as ,.^... QNSF Attthorizat on i' earin s:=
iY
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The National. Science Board of the National Science Found-
ati.on underlined the seriousness of the situation in the first
pt bli.c repor -*j it ever issued, Toward a Public Poolic,z for G #r_^,.te
!, d 7jc.ttion .* P the Sciences . As-Philip -i  Handler, President nt o-%' 1-ho T^^
WR17Rial
.Y= o^ Sc ences and former Chairman of the NSA{ Bon d
declared, the m,,^jssage underlying the report was the need for "a
frank admission that financial support y6 graduate education ivery largely a fedoral responsibility." 	 He stated:
If the Federal Government will accept this prop
o: tun frankly wx _. can then get on with the job
through any number of mechanisms.
The Board recommends that we continue to rely on
the research project grant and contract system as
the backbone of thy, research support system. But
it also recommends that true institutional costs
be funded by annual grants to the universities
which would cover indirect costs, all payments for
professorial salaries, etc. .A program of depart-
mental grants would provide for commonly used
equipment, sup;:,orting services such as the shop
or animal quarters, graduate student stipends,
e %J	 Other programs would make possible facil -
ities construction, university development and
fellowships respectively.
The Board's report not only pointed up the degree to which
cut-backs in science funding had deleterious consequences upon
graduate science education, but it also revealed the degree to
which Principal scientific spokesmen were being forced to rethink
old attitudes. The institutional grant, which gives university
administrators relatively more power over individual scientists on
the faculty, has never been popular with the scientific commu7aity.
The project grant tends to provide for a more direct relationship
between researcher and government agency. In calling for 20 per-
cent of all federal expenditures to be made up of institutional
grants by 1970, the Board is suggesting a figure "just 5 percent
less than the ratio rejected by the politicians of science in
1950," 11 when the National Science Foundation was created. The
shift reflects, to	 a ero oer awareness by scientists
that traditional methods of funding academic research -may well
have contributed to hurting the institutional fabric of univers-
ities. Universities, for their part, are thinking harder about
what kinds of research are appropriate or not appropriate for
them--particularly in the case of military-sponsored research.
10. "An interview with Philip Handler," National, Academy of
Sciences News Re , ortt, March, 190, P. 8.
11. John bear, "New Deal for Graduate Education , " Saturday
Pew, May 17, 1969, P . 79.
t.,.6—
As the tightening of funds is being accompanied by n Wnr.
Pssessment of government-university relationships, co altio
 "^
mfnit -indust,r ,ti ?rrnr7ements are getting a close look. Be'rin^^ r4
i retio acts :_"bo*
 ^t the mi Lit ary-industrial complex are specific carpi
i) a'.1 'qtr, '7.out co',.'A r act oi rer--runs , del berate cost-tinder -tinders
	-mnt icy .Poo." admi.nistrialti.on, patent giveaways, l and a government-industr-
partnership so complex that it is not clear which partner is publ,, .
which private, o° which is making the decisions. NASA meanwhile
.frets that the industrial capability it helped create in the pro-
cess of getting to the croon will atrophy in the absence of spc; , ed .
decisions involving substantial manned-space programs. Critics o^°
the agency, however, would like nothing better than to see that
capability--and NASA with it--wither away.
Thus, the budgetary statistics are but one indication of 4
much deeper malaise affecting government and science. There are
many who have given up on :science and technology. Handler has
jrointed out
Young people are not entering scientific careers
with the enthusiasm they had only yesterday. Gradu-
ate enrollments in the sciences have doubled every
ten years since the Civil Warp We saw no demo-
-	 graphic reason why this should change at this time.
Yet, it is now changing. This is partly due to
the operation of the draft, of course. But more
important is the concern that science isn't quite
as relevant to human affairs as we thought in the
.y
fifties,
This has had an impact on the thin:ing of some
mature scientists who are no longer quite as sure
of their place in society or ofl^heir value to
society as they were yesterday,
The matter of relevance stems from a growing concern for a
,v,hole host of societal dilemmas---usually subsumed under such
headings as the human condition, the quality of life, the urban
crisis--to which science and technology seems at best unconnected,
at worst, partly to blame. .A day of reckoning for science and
technology was bound to come, sooner or later. In 1958,. 	 speaking
of basic research in universities, a high-ranking Bureau of the
Budget official, William Carey, said as much:
We must realize that when science and education.
become instruments of public policy; pledging
their fortunes to it, an unstable equilibrium is
established. Public policy is, almost by defin-
ition, the most transient of phenomena, subject
from beginning to end to the vagaries of political
12. See the author's "Government, Industry, and the Re-
search Partnership The Case of Patent Policy," Public Admin-
istration Review, May/June 1968
13	 "NAS Pres ident Discusses
Engineering News, June 30 2 1969 ; p.U.S.  Science," Chemical and24.
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dynamism. The budget of a government, under the
democratic process, is an expression of the ob ject-
ves, aspirations and social values of a people in
a given web of circumstances. To claim stability
for such a product is to claim too much. In such a
setting, science and education become soldiers of
fortune. Today their fortunes happily are in the
ascendant.
In 1969 the government -science
 relationship is troubled.
Government is attempting to find a better formula to help it sup
-port and use science and technology in the nation's interest.
Scientists and engineers---and the institutions in which they work--
are searching for a way by which their interests may be brought in-
to closer harmony with the nation's. The foundation on which the
government-science marriage has rested since the war is eroding and
a: new one must be built. A number of problems must be faced. Three
of particular salience at this time are; 1) the place of basic
.research in a government of mission-oriented agencies; 2) the lack
of a truly national perspective on science policy; and 3) the noces-
city to better relate science and technology to the improvement of
the human condition.
BASIC SCIENCE AND MISSION-ORIENTED AGENCIES
No component of the R & D budget is more vulnerable to shift-
ing currents in administrative decisions than is basic research.
This is the dimension of science and technology that is most dif-
ficult to justify in terms of practical agency needs. Yet, as
indicated, it is the one with which the scientists and their univers-
ities are most concerned. If there is a single :interest that unites
the loosely organized qroup of men and women known aF the scient-
ific community it lies in their desire to do pure or basic research.
Pure research is that which, from an agency's perspective, is least
directed.	 What direction it has comes from the scientist and the
method and logic of his disciplines In applied research the agenc%,
exercises more control, and the sc;i bntist Jess, of the direction the
research takes since the agency is presumably paying the scientist, to
apply his skills to a specific agency problem. It frequen,ly is said
that an agency	 2 basic research,	 rch ses applied research,
Though it represents but a small portion of the total federal
outlay for R & D, the basic research fraction provides two=thirds ^t,)f
all research funds spent by academic scientists throughout the
country. Many regard it as the bellwether of government-science
relations. The attempt to :secure consistent support, for pure sc ioo^t
ist:s through administrative reorganization is at the heart of rec6nt
proposals for a Department of Science
14. William Carey, "The Support of Scientific Research,"
Scientific Manpower - 1957: Papers of the Sixth Conference of	 6
ent. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965 y p•	 ,.
t Scientific Manpower, Wash., D. C 	 NSF, 1958, pp. 23-26. Cited in'J.L. Penick, Jr., et. al., The Politics of Science 1939 to the Pres-
,8
The Department of Science, a ghost long thought vanished,
gained renewed importance as a proposal because of the man who
raised the issue. Obviously a trial balloon, it came from Donald
Hornig in a well-publicized speech before the American Association
for the Advancement of Science on December 29, 1968, The talk con-
stituted Hornig's farewell as Presidential Science Advisor.
After making it clear he was not urging that all basic re-
search be placed in one department, he stated that tFexe were many
activities of various agencies which were not central to their main
jobs and that would "flourish if transferred to a Department of
Science." The criteria for location in such a department, said
Hornig, should be an adtivity's relationship to basic research and
higher education. He figured the department's budget should be at
least $2 billion. He did not go into specifics, but underlined the
role of NSA" as the core of the department. His position was that
science was now so important in the nation's affairs that it .-e-_
served a place at the Cabinet table--a status he expected would
strengthen the general position of science in government. 1 5 Handler
later gave emphasis to the Department of Science idea in an inter-
view. While not officially endorsing it in his role as stational
Academy of Sciences President, he made it clear that eventually
science in government would have to be reorganized and, l.i.ke Hornig,
stressed: "Whatever the ygw package may be, what we have known as
NSF will be its nucleus."	 Representative Emilio Q. Daddario (item.
Conn.), Chairman of the House Science and Astronautics Committee's.
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, who comes closer
than anyone else to representing the interesto of basic science in
Congress, has begun discussing the need for greater "centralization"^	 g	 g	 g
of science activities. In spring, 1969 he said it was "too early
to act on the proposition of a cabinet-level, department because all
the information isn't at hand." However, he argued that prelim
inary steps should, be taken now, so that action could be takig in
the near future--a point that "should not Exceed two years." 
15. D.F. Hornig, "United States Science Policy: Its Health
and Future Direction," Science, February 7, 1969, pp. 527-28.
16. 'fNAS President Discusses U:S. Science," op. cit., pp.26-27.
17. , "Science Structure Criticized, " Industrial Research,
_May, 1949, p. 42. At Daddario' s direction, t" he Via;. rary o	 ongress
Sciexres Policy Research Division prepared a report entitled Cen-
trali„zation of Federal Science Activities. Published by House
^ xttee on science and Astronautics, 91st Cong., lst Sess. (Wash.,
D.C.: USGPa, 1969. Hereinafter cited as Centralization Report ,it contained a "model" for a central science agency.
^a
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As indicated, this is not -the first time the Department of
Science banner ha;; been waved. The idea has waxed and waned in
American history, moving in tune to scientists' satisfaction (or
Lack thereof) with the existing state of affairs in gover nment
support. It goes back at leant as far as the 1880 1 s when the organ-
ization of science activities was being considered by Congress fol-
lowin a period of growth in the federal research establishment.
In 1$54
 a Joint Commission was established in Congress. The Nat-
ional Academy of Sciences, chartered by Congress during the Civil
War to provide it with scientific advice, was asked for its views
on federal organization for scientific activities. An Academy ^.om-
mittee looked into the rnattor and suggested that the best form
would be a Department of Science. It felt the time was near when
the country would demand such a body. Just in case it was wrong
about the country's views, however, the Academy listed a :lesser re-
organization that would place various scientific bureaus into one
of the existing departments supervised by a scientist-dominated
commission drawn front public and private "sine. The congressional
group disagreed with the Academy and went along, with government
opinion which held generally that it was best if science was left
in the hands of those agencies that needed the research done.l^
The Department of Science idea rose again in 1946 when Repre-
sentative Clare Booth Duce introduced legislation "to foster, pro-
mote, and develop t'.:° study and spread of scientific knowledge and
its practical application to the enforcement of peace and the at-
tainment of high living standards throughout the United States and
the world. The bill stated further that the creation of an execut-
ive department was necessary "to correlate on the highest govern-
mental level the programs of national defense, national health, and
proper conservation and us19of the production and natural re-
sources of the Nation....
The bill died in committee, having been given little at-
tention by scientists. The lacy of attention was not cue to dis -
interest in government support, During the war pure scientists
had learned the virtues of public money., The reason lay in the
fact that a far more attractive bill was being considered. At
issue was legislation that would set up a central agency for basic
science in the executive branch. The very fact that a department,
as such, was not requested was perhaps significant in suggesting
the desire on the part of the bill's scientific supporters for non-
involvement in the political affairs of government. A Cabinet Sec-
retary loyal to the President was not what was wanted. The pri-
mary royalty of the head of the agency was to be t.o scierice.
The agency in question would be called, the National Re-
search Foundation. It was to be governed by a part-time Pres-
identially appointed board of non .-Government; scientists and a
director selected by and responsible to the board. One observer
1	 18. Centralization 	 , P. 32
19• Imo., PP• 34-35.
t
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has called the administrtl.tive plan "a design for support without
control, for bestowing upon science a unique and privileged place
in the public process---in su
and paid for by the public. "
re for science governed by scientists,
.
The Foundation was the brainchild of Vannevar Bush, Dir-
ector of the wartime science agency, the Office of Scientific
Research and Development. In his 945 report to President Truman
on postwar organization for research, Science, the Endless Frontie r,Bush explained why it was essential that science be given an agency
of its own. There was a it 	 law" that governed research, he
stated. "Under the pressure for immediate results, and unless de-
liberate policies aro set up to guard against this, applied re-
search invariably drives out pure." Thus, he declared, "The moral
is clear; It is pure research which deserHs and requires special
protection and specially assured support.
The obvious corollary to Bush's "perverse law" was that the
pressure for applied, in contrast to basic research, invariably
carne from those who didn't comprehend the importance of pure re-
search--namely politicians. The only answer was to insulate sci-
ence from politics- as much as possible. The insulation was too
much for President Truman, however, who vetoed the bill embodying
Bush's ideas when it reached his desk. It was not until 1950
that legislation finally passed setting up an agency specificallyfor science--NSF. 22 By this time conditions were so different
that scientists felt they could get along perfectly well without
a Departmen ' or central organization for science---which NSF cer-
tainly was not. For while NSF waited in the wings other agencies
staked out claims to basis: research territory--and various fact..-
ions of the scientific fraternity applauded from the sidelines.
20. Greenberg, oR. cit., p. 107.
21. Penick, op. cit., P. 145.
22. As it turned out, the Director would be appointed by
the President althc'gh the Board was retained. The reasons for
the lengthy debate on VSF were many and complex. There was com-
peting legislation and there were numerous issues--from the place
of social science research to patent policy--that kept holdiggy
the bill. up.
t
I
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23. Greenberg, ok . c t . , p. 134.
rt
_llr
tlen Science ana P1 uralism 1:Jere Fri ends
t
In 1(45 j the war was ending and Bush's OSRD teas .^.t^c,lkin ,
-forward to tor ,^%Lnating	 that most of its leaders could gcl. ba<:-k
to their civilinq
 pursuits. In the process of winding up itL
affairs it transferred 44 contracts to the National .institu	 of
Health in the Public Health Service in order to support the con-
tinuat^3n of university--based medical research that. it had under-
taken.	 NIH took it from there, building; in ensuing years a mas-
sive program of support for basic research in the various cherflical
biological, and medical sciences. Scientists in these fields were
delighted for they had never been very happy about being; lumped
with physicists and others in an all.- embracing; central science
agency. They wanted a home of their own and NTH could not have
been more inviting.
In 1946 came the Atomic Enf;rgy Act. Atomic energy wras a
field Bush had not broached in his report since at the time he
wrote it, atomic energy was locked in secrecy. The dominant view
about atomic energy after the war was that it was unique and there-
fore required an agency separate from the more general science
agency being discussed. With the life; sciences arid atomic energy
fields locked up in other agencies, the military began making their
move on the basic research front, led by the Office of Naval Re-
search. After the war QNR became the darling of 'the physical sci-
entists, supplying them with virtual blank checks, and, in the
process, establishing a beachhead for the Defense Department on
campuses throughout the country.
i
In 1951 NSF finally got started. It possessed the broadest
kin of mandate "to develop, and encourage the pursuit of a nat-
i.onal policy for the promotion of basic research and education in
the sciences." NSF was authorized to coordinate federal policies
for the promotion of basic research and education in the sciences.
It also was supposed to evaluate the scientific research programs
undertaken by other agencies of the federal government, But ilo
one took this language seriously--not even NSF. The agency's
director had neither the temperament nor the congressional backing
to engage the other, more established organizations in administra-
tive combat. It was all he could do to keep NSF alive in its
earl ',y years. Immediately after corning into existence, the Found-
atior; was hit by an economy drive and then the diversi on of re-
sources to pay for the Korean War.
Postwar science organization was thus established on the
principle of headless pluralism. There was no Department or
central agency for science; NSA' could not and would not dictate
a national science policy; t'he President was not concerned with
science policy. Basin research funding was dominated by a variety
of mission-oriented agencies, each going its own way. Si.n.ce
_12--
these agencies presumably supported research aiding their mis-
sions, it was ;somewhat ironic that they should be spending so
much for basic research. After all, basic research implies a
guest for understanding without thought to possible uses. The
mission agencies argued, however, that they were fulfilling a
need to sustain a national scientific capability which coed be
taDved for applied purposes in times of future emergency.
however reasonable _ , unreasonable the rationale, the fact
remained that few ques tioned the developing pattern of relations
between government and sc ,ioncu , Far from fulfilling its paper
responsibility as the leader of basic. research, NSF took the only
role Nett for it----that oa^"ga y
 :`i1^EZ^." It supported basic sczd
ence areas the mis sion agencies ignored or found unpalatable. In
science education HU had more maneuverability. But even here OF
steered clear of controvai rs JT , ta::i.ng pains to avoid giving any
impression of trying to set po ► ic:y for anyone.
In 1958, the next mono came to concentrate scientific effort
in one agency-- i.n this ease i Department. The push originated with
Senator Hubert Humphrey (Dem., Minn.) and his Senate Government
Operations Subcommittee on Reorganization. Humphrey's znotives were
largely managerial. He wanted to give some organization and dir-
ection to a field that, with V -ie coming, of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration in 1.958, was increasingly more fragmented.
The scientists rose up in opposition:
lm 	 The 1958 session of the Parliament of Science,
sponsored by the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, roundly denounced the idea of such a
Department, thereby
 bringing the organized voice of the
broad scientific community into opposition. Numerous
scientists personally testified against the creation of
a Department in congressional hearings, and finally the
executivo branch, reflecting the opinion of the scient-
ists through the Presi.dont's Special. Assistant for Sci-
ence and Technology and the National Science Foundation,
voiced emphatic disapproval and helped to stall the legis-
lative proposal in committee.25
The wisdom of th.,e scientists' position, at this point in
history, seemed clear. Most legislators were quite unaware of the
growth of agency spending for basic research . ,, Those who were aware
24. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Report,
The National Scienc e Foundation: A General Review of Its First
'(gyp	 't	 tT	 7} j'^ears a Wash . 	 • l+ o • V STPO, 1966, p. 5.
F	 25. J. Stefan Dupre and Sanford Lakoff, Science and the
Nation,  (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice Hall, 19621, P. 70.
:x
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tended to be sympathetic to scientific claims. They held to
their faith in basic science and worked with "their" agencies
' and 'their" scientific communities to keep the Humprey proposal
from getting off the ground. Science policy, or what passed for
it., emerFed from discrete centers of power that cut across seg-
ments of the executive, Congress, and the scientific community.
Thus, during the 1954 1 s and most of the 1. ljOO 's NIH was
able to ignore the wishes of its own department (health, Education,
and Welfare), the Bureau of the Budget, and even the President.
Every year, after receiving from the President the budgetary fig-
ure to which it was supposed to adhere, NIH would march up to Con-
gress and would always cone back with a larger appropriation than
that for which it had asked. Behind the scenes, NIH worked closely
with two legislative ru-ardians , Senator 1-lister Hill (Dem. , Ala.)
and Representative John Fogarty (Dem., Rhode Island) , chairmen of
the agency's respective appropriations subcommittees NIH worked
as well with allies in 'universities and the society at large. For
example, The American Cancer Society and American Heart Associ-
ation were convinced that if NIH were simply given enough money,
cures for cancer and heart disease would. surely be found. They
did not hesitate to speak up before Congress. NIH invariably re-
ceived what it "really" needed---not what a supposedly niggardly
President felt it should have.
Consequently the basic research budget of NIH soared. In
1955, NIH obtainhd $91 million; in 1.957, the sum was $213 million;
in 1959, the appropriation rose to $321 million. At the turn of
the decade NTH was &Atinp approximately three--quarters of a bil-
lion dollars. Presidential aides threw up their hands in exasper-
ation. George Kist::.akowsky, Eisenhower's second Science Advisor,
lAmente,d there was little the White mouse could do about NIH. It
was too Y)owerful, he declared. "Shannon£he MIli Directox had a
perfect understanding with Lister Hill ant John Fogarty.46
The coming of NASA substantially enlarged tl. ,3e basic re-
search pie--particularly after Kennedy's :1961 moon decision. The
agency determined that in the interests of space a great deal. of
pure research would have to be funded. In addition to the usual
project support NASA added a program helpful to universities as
institutions. This was NASA's Sustaining University Program, an
effort as innovative as it was quickly conceived. 27 Planned in
26. Greenberg, 2p. cit., pp. 282-83.
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1961 and launched in 1.962, it was not really announced to Congress
(via a line item in NASA's budget) until 1963. SUP was aimed at
helping higher education through fellowships, institutional. re-
search grants, and facility grants. The scientific community wss
jubilant that NASA had come into the federal science support pic«
tune, with academic administrators particularly pleased with SUP,
NASA's congressional space committees formally endorsed the pro-
gram once they understood what the agency was doing. The Pres-
ident, who had trouble getting money for science education through
-the "appropriate" agencies--NSF and office of Education--acquiesced".Some of this aides, however, grumbled at the way NASA had bull-
dozed ahead. From the perspective ofacademic science, however,
subsystem politics was good politics.
NIH, meanwhile, was spending $930 million for research in
1963" and in 196:)
 the agency pushed over the $1 billion dollar
mark for the first time. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Atomic Energy Commission, and high energy physicists saw eye-
to-eye on the need for a succession of atom-smashers, each larger
and more expensive than the preceding one. The military and ac-
ademic scientists continued their cozy relationship, thanks to a
willingness on the part of DOD's congresEiional committee to pay
for anything the department wanted. All was placid in the world
of govqrnment and science--until the long period of budgetary
growth came to a sudden, abrupt halt,
The Other Face of Pluraiism.
The year 1966 marked the beginning of the end of the growth
cycle in federal R & D. The good days had to conclude sooner or
later. Many in Congress who were not wedded to science by com-
mittee self-interest were getting restive as early as 1963, the
year they became fully cognizant of just how ample the R & D Hydra
had become. With Viet Nam, the riots in the cities, and a host of
other costly iteras on the federal agenda, the case against further
substantial increases for science and technology was clinched.
Hard questions began being asked both in Congress and the Execu-
tive. What became evident was that basic research, from the point
of view of the mission--oriented agencies, was an expendable item,
a luxury they could ill-afford in a time of belt-tightening.
NIH, for which the support of basic science had become virtu-
ally a mission unto itself, has been forced of late to recall its
public health mission and divert funds to applied research in
better ways to deliver health care. In mid-July 1966, President
Johnson, rumored to Pi.ave privately expressed concern to NIH about
"too much research being done for the sake of research," publicly
stated: "A great deal of basic.research has been done.
think the time has now come to ze 8 ii, n on targets by trying to
get our knowledge fully applied." The recent death of Fogarty
41_11 28. Greenberg, oR, cit-, pe 287*
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and retiremcnt, i	 1_x:11 and Shannon have removed much of NIM's
political	 and have contributed to opening up the agency
`
to new ideas not ^ ­, cessarily favored by the scientific community.
NTH has cut back on basic research in a number of areas such as
fundamental biology and chemistry.
The Defense Department also has been making a close review
of its R & D policieb . `1'o the applause of many but the chagrin of
those who had bcnefitted under the old rules, the Defense Depart-
ment is reducins- itr support for high energy and nuclear physics.
It has gone so far a: to announce its intention as a policy matter
to withdraw completely from these areas and from support of as-
tronomy except in its o yrwn laboratories-. Basic 2^ngineering is also
hurting from new Defense Department practices.
	 NASA's basic re-
search effort has suffered and its Sustaining University Program,
in particular, has been hard hit as declinin budgets forced NASA
to make priority d4,cisions. From a high of 45 million in 1966
SUP has fallen in 1969 to just $9 million. NSF is being pressured
to pick up where other agencies have withdrawn. But with an esti-
mated 1970 budget of $30 million NSF's hands are tied, At no
time has NSF's budget been such that it provided more than about
one-eighth of the total federal support for basic research or about
one-sixth of federal funds for academic science . 3 0 To the extent
it does assume grants formerly maintained by the mission--oriented
agencies, NSF further limits its own flexibility.
The scientific community is now seeing the other face of
pluralism and realizing that mission-oriented agencies are, almost
by definition, fair-weather friends of basic research. Thus, we
see the new willingness to reconsider the Department of Science
idea, or at Least various ways of making NSF more closely resemble
in size and influence the kind of central science organization Bush
had originally planned in 1945.
One apparont difference in approach today is the greater
political realism on the part of scientists, Far from avoiding
politics, the Department of Science proposal as set forth by Hornig
represents a com ing., to terms with .American politics. The scientific
coirmzunity has discovered that its interests in basic research and
higher education do rot; compete very well with more applied inter-
ests in the rrission-oriented agencies. in NSF, however, the scien-
tific point of view is dominant--to the point where NSF tradition-
ally is quite reluctant to get involved in research with an applied
flavor. The scientists t strategy calls today for building upon: the
power of the one agency in government in which they have privileged
access. To the extent the scientists succeed, they will build a
policy subsystem more capable of influencing the general system. As
sT.
T_
t.
,Hornig has stated:
With a strong cabinet officer for science in the Ex-
ecutive Branch, there would automatically be a stroni
congressional counterpart committee having a broad in-
terest in the problems of science and technology, not
a manor or incidental interest. . .
The head of the Department of Science "would have line
responsibility and public accountability and, most importantly, the
interest and confidence of the 'resident, the attention of the
Bureau of the Budget, and the ear of Congress."
If the Hornig view is at all representative of the new
strategy of science, it would suggest a remarkable turnabout in
the government-science relationship, administratively and pol-
itically. Having: grown to manhood on the periphery of admin-
istrative politics--a pampered stepchild of the mission agencies--
science now seeks to join the executive branch competition as a
full--fledged member of the family. It asks only that as it enters
the lists it be given a stronger mount than NSA` has heretofore been.
Given the constellation of forces affecting science and tech«
nology in 1969 and the foreseeable future, a Department of Science
may snake sense from the scientists' point of view.3 2 From another
perspective, it may not. Reorganizations have a way of creating
new problems as they solve old ones. More administrative clout for
science might help avert the operation of Bush's "perverse law."
It could at the same time worsen a number of dilemmas that flow
from the bottom-heavy pluralism that characterizes federal science
organization. The ultimate solution to what ails science and tech-
nology lies at the national, not the subsystem or subnatxonal level.
of ,goverment
NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
for some time has been giving attention to an examination of the
science policies of various member states. In the mid-196o's the
r
31	 Hornig, op. -cit ., P. 528
32. Michael Reagan, a political scientist who has given the
matter of federal organization for science considerable thought,
proposes a Department of Research and Higher Education amalga-
mating NSF, the National Foundation for the Arts and the Humanities,
and the Office of Education's Higher Education functions. See hisScience and the Federal Patron (N.Y.: Oxford, 1969), pp. 263-69.
'-"A cr ?,nn,	 purview, A team of observers came over to !C-8-^n
le"4,sons r 4 rh­ be garnered from the American experi_onc(., in
aclClce and	 One of thn. member  of the OECD tear,
X,,,,-,fevre, a former Plr i4n:- Minister of Belgium, wrote in their repo,.:-tt,
•	
0 1published in 1968, -^- that the group had come to this country
"looking. . for somet-1hing that was not there: a science policy,
disti nct fro),-n general policy, with its own aims and its special
administration and programs." Instead, he went on, what the visito-s
found was "a plurniity of policies and responsibilities split L-)e•
tween varied, but none the less
	 Such arrange-
ments might 	 I	 %J,;ht ^ -­` in the United States, he remarked, but "not, in
our view, because of their intrinsi - c qualities, but in spite of dew
fects which are no doubt tolerable and even profitable in a society
of plenty, but which would be unacceptable in a European society
veith limited resources."
The United States `Ls now finding that perhaps not even it
can continuo without something more closely approximating a nat-
ional science policy. It, too, must begin to make hard choices
about what to do in areas involving science and technology when
there isn't enough money to do everything. As indicated by the
preceding discussion of basic research, these choices tend to be
made today in a ,aphazard manner that has as its locus of decision-
making the agencies and departments, There has been precious
little of what another OECD observer, C.H. Waddington of Edinburgh
University-, called. ' 11-Mticipatory programming"--a decision-making that
pos'es -the question "Where do we want to go?" and then asks "How do we
zet there?' Most decisions in the United States, he noted, involved
projective programiang" i.e., an assessment of the present situation
as a basis for the question '%hero do we go from here?Y134
Foreign visitors -may be overly conscious of the fragmentation
of American government, but there is little question that they have
hit on some fundamental _we iakneas-e-s J_,n-Q'iW soiehce policy. Examples
are the lack of central initiatives, long-range perspectives, or
rational priority setting. That this is a serious problem in any
period much less one of 'budgetary stringency is obvious. Pulling, the
financial rug out from under basic research in so sudden a manner is
good neither for government nor science. However, moving ahead in
certain areas of science and technology without fully considering the
implications is equally senseless. Many of today's social ills stem
from yesterday's failures to anticipate consequences of scientific
and technological advances,,, Clearly, a broader, more searching ap-
proach to science decisions must be found.
33- Organization for Economic. Cooperation and Development,
Reviews of National Science Policy_: United 
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Unfortuna-,ely, it is almost inherently impossibl o for such
apenciez to ovaluate objectively technologies for which thay are
respom3ible. It is a cardinal rule cf public administrati,... 1'i tlha*"',
"every bureaucracy seeks first of all to survive; since Sig-vival JS
assured, by expansion, every bureau ,,-racy seeks to expand. ,,3,") n
cies accommodate themselves to a variety of environmental
ences of which the President represents but one, and frec:tzenl"lir
not the strongest,
In the case of atomic energy, for example, there -Jr. j,ell.-
atively little power the President exerts upon AEC. This- cnk:­,nc,,; is
responsive nrimarily to the Joint Committee on Atomic Enti,,.vy.
ident and Congress invariably go along with decisionS,
	 Pt
AEC-JCAE level of government. The problem, however, is tllcnt,
-oreW? ige and status--and thus the survival--of both agency and
cowraittee depend upon the ability to promote atomic energy
t r,chnology *
 Harold Green, who has studied atomic energy pol
Years, has indicated that what is good for AEC-JCAE is not,
sarily good for the country:
Under the national atomic energy program admin-
istered by the Atomic Energy Commission, private enter-
prise is encouraged, with AEC financial and moral $U[!-
port, to use and create huge quantities of radiation.
This r-c-diation is capable of producing immense harm to
the health and safety of the public unless properly con-
trolled or ., oAntained. A ­;tringeixt regulatory program has
been established to protect the public from the, ,.,3,e hazards,,
but ev(---n undor t hrl.,.z pz-ogra yyt rl ^ople will be exposed t(.
I*! , 	 Care ,y , "Science Polj, ,--, y ftklni^, in the United Stnte, 2_1135
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quantities of radiation which are only assumed, and
not known, to be tolerable. 37
Atomic energy is one of many technological fields in which
policy is made at the y '''.. n . -. -.:, .l t vel bf the U.S.  government
This fact is not neutral in aetermini.ng what kind ui' values are
given or are not given attention. Thu gs, Green makes the further
point:
. . . when government mckes a decision to develop a
technology on a more or less predetermined time scale,
there is a natural tendency for those who have a vested
interest in the program-•--in government (both in the
executive and Legislative branches) and in industry--
to become obsessed with their programmatic objectives
and to minimize the social hazards or problems which
may be inherent in practice of the technology after
it has been developed.38-
A number of critics of present science policy decision-making
processes have proposed reforms. Nicholas Golovin, for example, has
suggested a fourth branch of government that would employ "physicists
and social scientists.	 iri 7 making optimal technological
choices in public policy'' an^ thus "ensure sound planning decisions
for society in a time when grave consequences would follow from the
wrong decision ,)r even from indecision." The fourth branch would be
"an evaluative branch designed to function independently of the
original three branches--legislative, executive, and judicial"!
 It
would "a) collect all. the data necessary to continually track the
state of the nation; b) define potential problems suggested by the
information, c) develop alternate plans to cope with the problems,
and d) evaluate ongoin g; pro,jcc±.s :gin germs of real time and advise
the people accordingly. ., . . staffing would depend more on the
social sciences than on the other sciences but would call upon all
scidntific disciplines; its environment would be politically neutral,
its economic status and career stability comparable to that of the
judiciary. The 'fourth branch's' ower to counter-balance the older
three branches would reside in public , ccoss to its information as
well as to its conclusions." Establishing,
 such a branch would re-
quire.a constitutional amendment.39
37. Harold Green, "Technology Assessment and the Law: Intro-
duction and Perspective," George Washington L:aw Review (July 1960,
p 1039.
38. Ibid..
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Less demanding of substantial governmental reform,.but
similar in reflecting fears that existing institutions are not cap-
able of the "authoritative evaluti.on" the society needs, is a
proposal made by a panel of the National Academy of Sciences-Nat-
ional Research Council. The NAS-NRC panel advocates the addition
of "a new center for advance research . . ., a forum for exploring
.outside of regular channels .	 the theoretical and method-
ological problems of applying knowledge to social action . . . , an
independent . . . settingJ`"heyond 7 the pressures of poli-
tical preoccupations and cons-c- ai:nts . "
"Such a center might be called the National Institute for
Advanced Research and Public Policy," the panel suggested. What-
ever -the name, however, the organization should be established
jointly by the President and Congress and should be independently
endowed so as to bi "free to examine not only the issues of the
society but also the prevailing premises and perceptions of those
issues. f-Thus_7 . . . it could provide a kind of lightning rod for
future changes as an alternative to the frustrating process of an-
alyzing social and economic crises after they have occurred and
taken their toll.1141
X.
Representative Daddario has called for a Technology Assess-
ment Board responsible to Congress to aid that institution in deal-
ing with issues of science and technology. "Technology assessment,"
Daddario points out, "is a form of policy research which provides a
balanced appraisal to the policymaker. Ideally, it is a system to
ask the right questions and obtain correct and timely answers. It
identifies policy issues, assesses the impact of alternative courses
of action and presents fineings . It is a method of analysis that
systematically appraises the nature, significance, status and merit
of a technological program." The congressman stressed the need to
insulate the Board from"special interest pressures, whether these be
mission-oriented departments and agencies, members and committees of
Congress, or the private sector. "42
There has been a potpourri of other suggestions in the past
few years. Most of them reflect a growing; concern that existing
institutions are not up to the new demands brought by science and
technology. In addition they indicate a feeling that a more "trust-
worthy" source of evaluation is necessary than is currently being.
provided under existing arrangements.
Certainly there is a need for independent evaluation of sci-
ence and technology programs. But there is no guarantee that an
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Emilio Q. Daddario, "Technology Assessment--A Legib-
lative View," Gem_ Washing ton Law Review (July 1968), pp 10543
105$.
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outride group can examine a technology and agree on its assessment
any better than can more "political" institutions. Moreover, ex-
perts have often been wrong in the pa pct. For example, a panel of
the rational Academy of Sciences on Weather and Climate Modification
in 1964 called rainmaking by cloud-seeding "astrology." In 1966,
literally forced to review information supplied by commercial seeders
(i.e., nonscientists) the same Panel had to admit there was some-
thing to rainmaking after all. It took 20 years From the invention
of cloud-seeding in 1 0.46 for a consensus to be reached among sci-
entists that "it -.corks ! " In •:.hc interim, most of the advances that
took place in the field occurred in spite of expert opinion.
This is not «n attemp rc to undervalue the need for as much
study as can be brought to bear upon public policy in science and
technology. 'Rather it is to einphaaize that any organization or
institution made	 co-.;lposed of hwran beings will have weak-
nesses. "Philosopher kings" will inevitably bring to government
their own professional perspectives and biases. Experts may supply
more rational imputs to the decilecion-making process. They cannot
remove politics from that process, at least as long as policy de-
visions deal with values about what ought to be. Democracy has its
own logic, however imperfect, for getting at the truth.
Presidential Pers ectives
In making and Jmp.le.renting sc:1 once policy the President's
role is central. In his essayr ."Managing the Federal Government,"
Stephen Bailey put it succinctly: "The Presidency is the only
institution in the A:meric^.n polity where overarching and long-range
public imperatives can be coherently analyzed and melded. This is
true both because of the ubiquity of the presidential constituency,
and because the President is rnandated to '-eco:,,imer..^ to the Congress
a cohr rnn • ?^1 
+^^ 
• . -'0:.' v^.^-^ G' ^ ^_.^t ^ soz^^^ce ; '-o ,:,nd i%,i.thin the exec-
utive branch.
To do his ,job the President needs the best thinking he can
get on all facets of federal science policy. He bas his Science
Advisor and numerous other unit;9 in the Executive Office to aid him
in getting information. The :most important of these are the Office
of Science and Technology and,the President's Science Advisory Com-
mittee The Science Advisor is in charge of both. OST is a 20-man
Office to which was transfer.—ad the national science policy role
formerly held, but never e:9 ere:*L-:;ed, by NSF. PSAC is a group which
meets for two days-of each	 and which is composed of 17 eminent
,men drawn from private life t, Another important governmental, body is
the Federal. Council for Science and Technology, a subcabinet entity
chaired by the Science .Advisor.
"
	
	
There are n=umerous other organizations or individuals through-
out the country from whom the President can seek advice. He can
f
appoint any number of task forces. There is no substitute, however,
43. Stephen K, Bailey, 4tManaging the Federal Government,"
Agenda for the Nation, K. Gordon, ed. (Wash. , D.C.: Bro^y 196
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for an established working staff, one that is close enough to him
to see the world as he sees it and involved enough in day-to-day
decisions to feel the political heat as he feels it. As elaborate
as the machinery is for aiding the President in science policy, it
may yet fall short of being what he needs to cope with increasing
policy complexities. Hornig alluded to this in his "Farewell"
speech. He recommended adding more staff to OST and making: the
Science Advisor head of a three-to five-man Council of Science and
Technical. Advisors. As an alternate plan, he suggested supple-
menting the present director and deputy director of OST with three
assistants. With more staff, he poin""ed out, it would be possible
to prepare for Congress and the President an annual report on the
state of U.S. science and technology roughly analogous to the annual
Economic Report.
Hornig went so far as to recommend that CST evolve
into an office of planning, evaluation, and
analysis, looking broadly at national problems
with some scientific or technological Component
but extending well beyond the purely technical
areas. The OST has been moving in this direction
in its work in environmental pollution, urban
needs, and the world food problem.44
Planning has often been considered a dirty word in America.
But at the Presidential level, and especially where science and
N technology is concernpd; planning is an inescapable executive
responsibility. The President must seek to represent the interests
of the future.	 The realization that decisions of the present in,
flue'nce favorably or unfavorably the lives of later generations ics
implicit in Waddington's notion of 'anticipatory programming."
It is noteworthy that the Science Council of Canada has
recently proposed a National Science Policy that sets forth certain
basic societal objectives--national prosperity, physical and mental
health and high life expectancy, etc.---as a framework for policy-
making in science and technology, The Canadian design attempts to
ask "Where do we want to go?" It also attemp^s to decide which sci-
ence programs are major and which are minor.
This is the kind of thinking that must be adapted to thej American scene and can best take place at the White House Level.While i.t - i.ght have been possible to skirt the priorities issue at
a time when R & H expenditures were on the upswing, it is difficult
to avoid doing so now that the budget has Levelled: off. If the
44. Hornig, op. cit., p.
-527
,
45. Science Council of Canada, Towards a National Science
Policy for Canada , (Ottawa, Canada: Queen's  renter, 1968T.
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President does not develop a research strategy in terms of broad
national interests, a strategy will be established by the indiv idun!
agencies in terms of their interests.
Subnational Competition
If the President could formulate a national science policyhe iiould have to implement it. There is no point in underestimati a -
the difficulty of this responsibility. Since his own time is
	 -
limited, the President must rely upon his Science Advisor, QST, and
other mechanisms at his disposal to carry out policy in his naive.
The burdens of implementation are great. They reveal the less glaifl--
orous side of policymak ng. They call for selling Presidential
policy to subnational centers of power which are often content with
the way things are and resent interference by the Chief Executive.
An dST staff member has described what this often entails as:
"finding a hall that will lead to getting what you want from an
agency after going; d,o^;rn earlier ones only to have doors slammed in
your face."
The ability of agencies and departments to say 'Vo l ' to the
President is considerable. It varies in degree with their respons-
iveness to other forces in their political environments. Among
these forces Congress looms large. The national legislature, working
through its various committees, has power over what the agencies are
._ permitted to do and how well they can do it. It relies u pon such *volt
 as authorizations, appropriations and the investigatory process. Con—gress thus exerts a continuing influence, out its committees repre-
sent, interests more specific than those of the President, Often
there is disagreement with the Presidential perspective on what an
agency should do in a given area. Attempts at coordinating a. nat-
ional program in such a congressional environment become extra-
ordinarily frustrating.
The weather modification program is an excellent illustration
of some of the dilemmas of making sense out of fragmented agency
efforts, and the rple congressional committees can play in hamper-
ing coordination.	 It is one of the smallest and most obscure
science programs extant with only $11.8 million for the entire fed-
eral effort estimated for 1970. However, its potential implications
for domestic and foreign policy are so great that the President,
through his Science Advisor and Bureau of the Budget, has had to
give attention to its organization and direction. To do so has not
been a sample matter. There are at least seven agencies working
and fighting over the various aspects of the field, from fog dis-
perse- to hurricane suppression. Agencies as diverse as Agricul-
ture and Navy have research projects in operation.
46. The author is presently engaged in writing a casehistory of Federal Weather Modification Policy.
1aere ,. C: ­,4 fl7n^.-r no national weather modification pro rum
ansl it	 -preed that the field desperately needs mars~
cohereacc for wa:.,	 progress lo A number of administrative de-
V *.cos h-ave been u,J . ,d1. --r suggested for the purpose of more balancc^c: ,.:	 ;,
and directed acti m' '--, . Most utilized in practice has been the
federal Council on '0)cience and Technology, whose watchword seem
to be national policy - ,through consensus, All agencies with inter.-
ests in the field are represented on an atmospheric sciences sub.-
committee of the Federal Council. They meet, exchange information,
and discuss any and all matters pertaining to weather modification.
They usually can reach agreement on everything except the most
important questions in designing a natior4al program- -priorit _-Les a.- ,164
agency jurisdictions.
Another device which has been forwarded by the Executive
Office to assist in planning is that of the "lead" agency. In s-,ach
an instance, one agency takes responsibility for designing and
coordinating a multiagency research program. For example, in
weather modification, the agency the Bureau of the Budget champions
is the Environmental" Science Services
 Administration. ESSA presumably10
has the most extensive scientific competence in the field. Its
mission gives it an across-the-board interest in weather phenomena
and it already has lead status in most weather services due to the
fact that one of its subunits is the Weather Bureau.
Whatever the merit in theory has been of giving ESSA the
,lead, there is little chance of such a developmant succeeding in
practice. ESSA has an estimated 1970 weather modification budget
of $1.6 million. The Bureau of Reclamation has a comparable bud-
,get of $4.8 million. ESSA says it merely wishes to coordinate.
DuRec says ESSA defines coordination as take-over.
What BuRec and its western-based congressional constituency
fear is that ESSA i,^rould not be as favorably inclined as they are
to rain.making•-and particularly a rainmaking program with a regional
orientation. In the 1950's the Weather Bureau was, in BuRec's
view, negative on the subject of rainmaking. and BuRec fears ESSA
might downgrade its effort. So this one dimension 
of 
weather
modification gets "special" protection and treatment from BuRec and
its congressional allies who want water for their arid states.
ESSA, on the other hand, has a congressional constituency that is
not particularly excited about weather modification and, in some
cases, opposed to it.
Tice BuRec-ESSA split bas exacerbated whatever inherent
limitations interdepartmental councils and lead agency concepts
may already have in working out overall programs. An alternative--
asking a 'ri espected scientist-administrator in a neutral agency to
design a ­)rogrum--vas consequently tried an the weather modification
case. Homer Newell, a high ranking NASA official, was asked to
chart a national program and he accepted. But the proVram he &--,-
-:)ipned which gave something to everyone, and aVol: d6d eivinp too
much to anyone, has probably served more.to
 kindle NASA's interest
in'.the field than to stimulate cooperation among the already inter
ester) Darties.
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As a final solation there is always
all elements of weather modification into a
agencies are against this unless tha serve
agency.
the thought of putting
single agency . . All
as the base for the new
It i s obvious that weather modiflcation has not really been
run as a coordinated national effort, and there is little likeli-hood, short of strong Presidential intervention, that it will be.
With more science policy staff for planning and direction the Pres-
ideht might be in a better position to take hold of tbi5 program
before it gets completely out of hand. But the difficulty of doing
so cannot be underestimated. One may ask, If the President cannot
coordinate a national program for scientific small-fry, how can he
hope to move very far in implementing, a more general national sci-
ence policy? Obviously, he cannot move very far at all--unless he
has congressional cooperation.
Congressional Cooperation
Under the Constitution, Congress has a great deal to :say
about the degree to which the President can implement science
policy. Establishing anything resembling national goals or research
strategies upsets arrangements worked out at the subsystem level. Itis therefore incumbent upon the President to look for help in Con-
gress as a whole against the congressional committees that so great-
ly limit his own effectiveness in managing the executive branch,
,,,There are no easy solutions, no magic levers the President can press.
ITe must work with what sources of support he can find, through bring-
ing together bits and pieces of' influence.
Some of the bits and pieces are missing, however. If the
President develops a national science policy, one of his chief
problems lies in getting it heard and discussed in its entirety.
The committees look at science in terms of specialized areas--
space, health, defense, etc. The Daddario subcommittee in the
House has a broad jurisdiction in science policy, but there is no
.counterpart in the Senate' Daddario t s role in connection with NSF,
the Department of Science idQa, and basic research probably makes
him Seeffl to other committees as no more disinterested than they.
The interest he pushes is simply science, as contrasted with a spec-
ific technology,,, The two Government Operations subcommittees that
deal with science are too limited in their jurisdictions to provide
the proper platform.
What is needed is something new, unifying, and more clearly
"above the congressional battle." This might well be a Joint Com-
mittee on Science and Technology. Such a committee, composed of
senior legislators from both Houses, could meet to study and debate
a report on national science policy prepared by the President. It
would have no power other than that of publicly discussing and
illuminating an overview of federal science and technology policy.
,lopefully, a base of information would thus be produced that would
provide a backdrop for further discussion of the pieces of the 8ci-
ence policy picture as they are treated in the regular conLrd_ttees,,
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Me fact that science policy is not yet a partisan issue
would
 help the President gain the err of all the party leaders, notJust his own. At stake is the general against the specific, the
long-range against the short. At present, the push and pulls of
subsystem politics overwhelm all other influences, deteimini ng pri-
ority decisions almost by accident. It may be said that this is
simply the way things are done in American public administ:cration
Perhaps! But observers of the system must forward the quastion o'LL
 business as usual methods are good enough in the designing
of policy so crucial to the nation'ss future
SCIENCE AND THE HUMANT
 CONDITION
If there is an area of public administration today in whi.c lathe methods used to deal with problems are clearly u:asatas-factory,it lies 3 n those especially co.n.cerne ..^^► +^, the 3^„ ii•• .^a ^ //aC^a 3^d -IC d^,r^,T	 s..	 .iw^  	 .I	 aV	 4a':+	 VY.L. V26	 i.Lt,. Z IABIlCjr ZR t+oASL.I..G. Lr S.4 f 8.4P
Involved are a hest of titanic social problema-----.from poverty to
pollution, :from urban blight to overpopulation. Science and tech-
nology has generally had little to say about such issues. Governmo.nt
and science has been even slower to shift priorities concerning the i
The R & D budget continue& to be colored by cold war orientations
Some entrenched scientists would apparently-prefer to continue their
tradi.ta onal. behavior under support from Defense Department, NASA,
AEC or , even better, a Department of their gown, than to meet new
demands from-different agencies for mission-oriented applicationsin the social. realm.
Meanwhile, the social problems are not going away and are
getting worse in many respects. Traditional  sources of funds are
.starting to tighten at the same time as the nation, very slowly, be-gins shifting priorities. For example, as small as they are in com.Parisi-on with the big science agencies, the R & D budgets of socialprobl bm ^ agencies such as Housing and Urban Development are at least
rising when may other agencies are having trouble preventing de-
creases.
47. Bai.l.ey, 9,R.^ cit,	p . 328 .
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The research partnership, like any social entity, must
ad,juet to new demands as the price of survival.
	 In the 19701s,
when the United States will hopefully experience a post Viet Nam
economy and the Cold War psychology may have more completely worn
off, it is very likely there will be a conscious attempt by govern-
ment to roduee what Alvin Weinberg has called "cheap technological
fixes. a'49 `these innovations would attempt to provide short-cuts
to the reaol.ution of difficult, perhaps Qtherwise unbearable: socia.1
nrobl.ems w Fcr exaripl.e ;
 the population explos ion
 in underdeveloped
countries cannot be solved quickly. It will take years for the
ingrained curios that govern the number of children couples have
to change or be changed. In the interim, human misery in those
lands will be catastrophic and all attempts at development will be
cancelled out. Better birth control devices and new sources of
food could, however, help to buy time for the grove: .:: ats in ques-
tion, permltt_.ng ahem to conduct the necessary educational tasks
aimed at ending the upward spiral of population.
Similarly, science and technology can grapple with the phys-
ical aspects of urban problems. It can contribute to devising ways
to produce better low-cost housing, mass transportation, city plan-
ning, community architecture, and quality of environment .49 Bvt
there 'is no guarantee such efforts will mitigate the underlying,
social-needs any more than birth control devices can lessen popu-
lation growth if people choose not to use them
Suffice it to say that science and technology is not the
solution to the multiwd:e of mankind's woes but simply a useful tool
Moreover, technological fixes can be nixed blessings, Proponents
of peaceful uses of atomic energy are convineed, f eir exwnple, that
eventually their technology will solve virtually all the world's
endT,Vy requirements. They may be right. In the meantime, however,
radioactive wastes create problems of their own..
This is not to take the position that some critics of sci-
ence and technology adopt. They see only the possible horrors and
none of the potential benefits. It is merely to indicate that the
relationship of science and technology to the human condition is
extremely comply. in most cases, science and technology can help,
but c, an;no'c solve problems that have roots in man and his institu-
tions. To the degree it can help it should be used. Like any other
resource in the public adid nistrator's arsenal, it must be employed
48. Alvin Weinberg, Reflections on B Science (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1967 ), p. =
49,, "An Interview with Philip Handler," 	 , P. 7.
t
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careful with full attention
quences . Q The difficulties
out "in process . " The problei
must be addressed cry out for
cannot afford to stand aloof.
to do so and at the sane time
it has become accustomed.
to ito second and third ceder conse-
are many and will have to be worked
us to which science and technology
action. The scientific community
Society is not likely to permit it
be supported in the manner to which
f
While keeping the best of the old enterprise intact, govern-
ment and science will have to move to meet new challenges. This isbound to cause strains and require basic changes in the existing
roles of many of the principal participants, Some of the impli-
cationsfor the un.iversitX are already apparent. The research
partnership is in transition. The passage will be turbulent.
50. See Raymond A. Bauer (ed.), Social Indicators, (Cam-bridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1966) . Also James	 paE . We b, Sce AgeManagement N.Y.: Columbia, 1969) . The significance of see
an tec nology for the education of public administrators is great.
It may well be that the only relevant training for public adminis-
tration today is that which cuts across the two cultures. Carroll(op cit., pp. 907-908) suggests the management of science in the
city will require the O-evelopment of a social technology--"a method
of organizing fiscal., legal, architectural, planning, managerial,
and technological expertise."
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